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Appellants, Dimicks, pursuant to Rules 24, 26 and 27 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, reply as follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellee's answering brief (1) confradicts its position in the trial court by 
now arguing that causation was an issue below; (2) misrepresents the record below 
by arguing that Dimicks did not identify specific defects in the subject product for 
the trial court; and (3) materially omits reference to Dimicks' express argument 
made in the trial court that no admissible evidence supports Oakwood's claim that 
the subject product was approved by a government agency. 
For these reasons, as well as those presented in Dimicks' Opening Brief, 
Dimicks respectfully pray this Court enter its order vacating the trial court's 
summary judgment order and remanding this matter for trial on the merits. 
ADDENDA TO RECORD ON APPEAL PER RULE 24fa)Ql)(C) 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
ADDENDUM 1: Trial Court's Memorandum Decision on Defendants 
Oakwood's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
ADDENDUM 2: Plaintiffs Objection to Oakwood Defendants Proposed Finding 
of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and Certified Order of Final 
Judgment. 
ADDENDUM 3: Transcripts from Hearing on February 28, 2005. 
ADDENDUM 4: Transcripts from Hearing on September 23, 2005. 
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RELEVANT EXCERPTS FROM THE RECORD BELOW 
WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD 
PER RULE 24(a)(7), UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
1. The causal relationship between the defects in Appellee's 
manufactured home and the hantavirus that killed the Appellants' decedent, Cathy 
Dimick. and grievousl} injured Appellant Chris Dimick, was not disputed by 
Appellee in the trial court, and Appellee expressly represented to the trial court 
that causation was not an issue, 
"The Court: Do I not even get to a question—or at least at this level of 
whether there's evidence that the hantavirus came from mice that 
were in this house as opposed to someplace else in the world? 
Mr. Hitt [Oakwood's counsel]1: For this motion, your Honor, I don't think 
we even have to reach that point. I think the threshold inquiry is— 
The Court: These three-
Mr. Hitt: -is there a defect in this home." 
(R. at 644, Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr. 18:15-23, February 28, 2005). 
Oakwood's summary judgment motion rested solely on the argument that 
"because there is no evidence of a defect or defective condition, [Dimicks] also 
cannot meet the second and third prongs of the test." (R. at 304). Oakwood's 
-* 
summary judgment motion was silent to causation. 
The transcript incorrectly labels the speaker during this colloquy as Mr. Booke when, in 
fact, it was Oakwood* s counsel Mr. Justin Hitt. 
Although causation was not raised by Oakwood's summary judgment motion, and that 
position was reiterated in oral argument, Oakwood prepared Finding of Fact, Conclusions of 
3 
Even if causation had been an issue—although it was not raised or even 
mentioned in Oakwood's summary judgment motion—the record does contain 
sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact: 
"On March 11, 2000, Reid Dimick, Cathy Dimick and Chris Dimick went 
into a home, manufactured by Oakwood, which was sitting on the Happy Homes 
sales lot in Helper, Utah. While looking in a bedroom closet, they saw deer mice 
nestings and droppings. (R. at 382, 385, 427-434, 436). 
On May 27, 2000, Cathy Dimick became violently ill with Hantavirus. She 
died within three days of the onset of her final illness. Three days after Cathy's 
death, Chris became violently ill with Hantavirus. He is now permanently disabled 
as a result of the Hantavirus. (R. at 382-383, 385, 438-444). 
Reid Dimick knows of no Hantavirus exposure that Cathy and Chris could 
both have suffered, except for their simultaneous exposure in Oakwood's 
manufactured home on the Happy Homes sales lot on March 11, 2000. (R. at 383, 
385, 446-448)." 
2. Appellants specifically identified the alleged defect in Oakwood's 
manufactured home for the trial court as being the 30-50 penetrations that were 
Law, and Certified Order of Final Judgment, including Conclusion of Law "2. Plaintiffs offered 
no evidence that the Home was unreasonably dangerous due to a defect or defective condition, 
no evidence that a defect existed at the time the Home was sold, and no evidence that a defective 
condition was the proximate cause of their alleged injuries." (R. at 616-617). Plaintiffs timely 
objected to that conclusion, among others. (R. at 609-612). 
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purposely manufactured into the exterior walls and underside of the home, and not 
covered after manufacture, thereby creating a point of entry for rodents, including 
hantavirus-carrying deer mice that were known to be present in the Price/Helper 
area where Oakwood knew the home would sit in an open-field sales lot. (R. at 
382-384). 
The record contains evidence of this defect, specifically, the testimony of 
John Schram, an employee of the sales lot in Helper: 
Q. [By Mr. Booke] A little while ago you were talking about the 
penetrations that were sometimes put in the modular homes for plumbing 
and other reasons? 
A. [By Mr. Schram] Uh-huh. 
Q. Did you caulk those holes as part of patching up the holes or did you 
put caulk in the holes that were already there for plumbing or other reasons, 
electrical? 
A. The factor}7 puts their plumbing and electrical through the holes and 
I'm not sure if they caulk or put like foam, the expanding foam. I think they 
do in some instances put the expanding foam around the pipes where they 
penetrate. 
(R. at 451, 468-469). Mr. Schram further testified that, after the home arrived at 
the Price/Helper sales lot, interior insulation could be seen through the 
penetrations in the exterior walls. (R. at 399-401, 464-465). 
This evidence was presented to the trial court in Appellants' opposition to 
Appellee's summary judgment motion (R. at 382- 384, 399-401) and in oral 
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argument on the motion (R. at 644, 645, Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr. 9:10-24, 12: 2-
13, February 28, 2005). 
3. Dimicks unequivocally argued to the trial court that there was no 
admissible or probative evidence that any government inspector inspected the 
manufactured home, or that a government inspector approved the 30-50 open 
penetrations, or that the home was approved by an\ government agency. 
Specifically, the following argument was made relative to the HUD 
inspection form: 
"Mr. Booke:. . . Moving onto the specific findings of fact, finding of fact 
No. 3 says that on June 24^, 1998 the home is inspected by the 
United States Government and certified by the United States 
Government. 
There is no evidence in the record of that fact. What 
there is is a form called the "HUD checklist.'' Somebody went 
through a HUD checklist and checked off four pages worth of 
stuff; but there is no evidence before your honor that that was a 
government inspector that did that. No evidence that there was 
any government approval of that—or inspection or approval of 
that particular home. 
With respect to— 
The Court: Doesn't —doesn't the business record that was submitted do 
that? 
Mr. Booke: I think not. 
The Court: Isn't that a business record? 
Mr. Booke: Well, Fve got it right here, your Honor. It says-it's called a 
"HUD Compliance Assurance Inspection Form." Now, there is 
nothing whatsoever that shows on the face of the document or 
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suggests—nor is there any testimony or covering affidavits or 
anything like that that says that's a government form. 
(R. 645, Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr. 12:2-23 September 23, 2005). 
The court recognized the presence of Appellants* objection to a finding that 
the home complied with government standards: 
The Court: Well, in his [Dimicks] objection to the findings of fact, 
paragraph 3, he says, "There's no evidence in the record that 
the home met government standards." 
(R. at 645, Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr. 13:10-12 September 23, 2005). 
The absence of admissible evidence of government approval is underscored 
by Appellee's counsel's failure to give a straight answer to the trial court's direct 
question about the evidentiary sufficiency of the document that Appellee claimed 
represented government approval: 
Mr. Hitt: . . . Now, this home, before it was tendered to the retailer, 
passed HUD inspections. They looked at it. They said 
everything was okay; and they sent it out. 
The Court: And you have an affidavit in your motion to that effect, don't 
you? 
Mr. Hitt: I have a HUD inspection checklist signed. 
The Court: That's right, okay. 
(R. at 644, Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr. 5:18-23, February 28, 2005). 
Indeed, Appellee specifically misrepresented the content of the HUD 
checklist to the trial court: 
Mr. Hitt: . . . They have penetrations in them. Those penetrations are 
signed off by HUD. They're part of the checklist the 
government has said "Not a problem.'" which creates the 
presumption that this home was free of defects . . . 
(R. at 644, Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr. 16:11-14. February 28, 2005). 
In fact, the HUD checklist is completely silent as to these penetrations. (R. at 
331-338). 
ARGUMENT 
I. CAUSATION WAS NOT DISPUTED BY APPELLEE, .AND WAS 
WAIVED BY APPELLEE, IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
The record is clear that Oakwood waived any causation argument by (1) not 
raising the causation issue in its summary judgment motion, and (2) expressly 
arguing to the trial court that causation need not be addressed. Then, despite not 
having argued causation, Appellee included a Conclusion of Law concerning 
causation, to which Plaintiffs timely objected. 
Issues not properly raised at the trial court will not be considered by an 
appellate court. Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, \ 9, 17 P.3d 1122. In Coleman, 
the Utah Supreme Court refused to hear three issues that were not raised before the 
trial court, and the record did not reveal the Appellant had ever asked that they be 
addressed. Id. 
In fact, although causation was not raised, the record does contain sufficient 
evidence of causation to defeat summary judgment—the only time and place at 
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which Cathy and Chris Dimick were together during the incubation period for 
hantavirus was when they disturbed a deer mice nest and droppings in a closet in 
Appellee's manufactured home on a sales lot in Helper. (R. at 383). Deer mice are 
carriers of hantavirus. (R. at 380). Cathy Dimick died from hantavirus and Chris 
Dimick became seriously ill and permanently injured from hantavirus. (R. at 439, 
382-383). Thus, the record—even though developed in the absence of a challenge 
on the causation issue—clearly contains prima facie evidence of a causal link 
between the specific defect and the injuries the Dimicks have suffered. (R. at 385). 
II. THE RECORD CONTAINS EVIDENCE OF A SPECIFIC DEFECT, 
AND APPELLANTS PRESENTED AND ARGUED THAT 
EVIDENCE BELOW. 
Appellants demonstrated below the existence of the 30-50 unsealed, pre-
drilled holes in the exterior of Appellee's manufactured home, and argued that 
those holes comprised a specific defect because the holes created points of entry 
for hantavirus -carry ing deer mice. To defeat a summary judgment motion, a 
plaintiff need only show circumstantial evidence, whether expert or not, that a 
defect existed. Taylor v. Cooper Tire and Rubber Co., 130 F.3d 1395, 1398, (10th 
Cir. 1997) {applying Utah state law). 
Moreover, HUD regulations specifically identify potential defects in a 
manufactured home relative to the hazards of rodents entering the home: (1) the 
seam around the base of the home, and (2) the openings around the predrilled 
9 
holes/ Those regulations provide that: "All exterior openings around piping and 
equipment shall be sealed to resist the entrance of rodents.'" 24 C.F.R. 3280.603 
(b)(6). 
Appellee contends the holes were generally caulked. The record shows that 
the holes were occasionally caulked. The testimony of John Schram, a person with 
personal knowledge of the condition of the subject home on the sales lot in Helper, 
is unambiguous in this respect: "I think in some instances they put the expanding 
foam around the pipes where they penetrate." (R. at 451, 468-469). (Emphasis 
added). Mr. Schram went on to say that he could see the pink insulation through 
the penetrations in the exterior walls. (R. 399-401, 464-465). 
Perhaps Appellee's home satisfied the HUD requirement that "All exterior 
openings around piping and equipment shall be sealed to resist the entrance of 
rodents." 24 C.F.R. § 3280.603(b)(6)—and perhaps it did not. Perhaps Appellee is 
entitled to a presumption of non-defectiveness and perhaps it is not. That is 
precisely why summary judgment on these issues is inappropriate. Either way. it 
is beyond fair dispute that the record reflects that Appellants presented evidence 
and argued below that 30 to 50 unsealed penetrations in the exterior are a specific 
defect in Appellee's product that is the subject of this action. 
Indeed, the very HUD checklist on which Appellee's rely addresses rodents: "Bottom 
Board was Sealed & Repaired to Prevent Rodent Access.'5 (R. at 338) 
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III. THE ISSUE OF COMPLIANCE WITH GOVERNMENT 
STANDARDS WAS ADDRESSED BELOW AND, THEREFORE, 
PRESERVED FOR .APPEAL. 
During oral argument on February 28, 2005, the trial court heard arguments 
on the issue of whether the HUD document created a rebuttable presumption of 
non-defectiveness. The trial court heard that the document was unsupported by 
affidavits and was signed by an unidentified person. (Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr. 
5:18-24, February 28, 2005). 
The trial court also heard misrepresentations by Appellee as to how the 
home met government standards in relationship to the penetrations in the walls— 
an argument that the HUD checklist approved the unsealed exterior penetrations 
when, in fact, the HUD document is silent as to approval of penetrations in the 
walls and, specifically, as to the sealing of any penetrations in the exterior walls. 
(R. at 331-338). 
On September 23, 2005, the trial court heard further argument relative to the 
authenticity of the HUD checklist and as to its admissibility. (Oral Argument 
Hr'g. Tr. 12:2-23, September 23, 2005). Specifically, the trial court heard that 
there was no evidence that a government employee signed or initialed the HUD 
checklist. Id The trial court heard the argument that the record contained nothing 
to indicate that the checklist was even from the government, and that from the face 
11 
of the document it appears to be initialed and completed by employees of 
Oakwood. Id. 
Moreover, even if the HUD checklist were "admissible evidence" under 
Rule 56. the document should be admitted for exactly what it stands for—that the 
house did not meet government standards, specifically it did not meet the 
requirements of 24 CFR § 3280.603(b)(6). (Rodent resistance. All exterior 
openings around piping and equipment shall be sealed to resist the entrance of 
rodents). 
CONCLUSION 
The presence of 30-50 unsealed holes is a specific defect in Oakwood's 
Homes. This specific defect is identified in the record and was argued below. The 
"HUD checklist" relied on to create a presumption of non-defectiveness does not 
address these unsealed holes, it lacks all evidentiary foundation, and it is contrary 
to the Code of Federal Regulations provisions cited in Oakwood*s Opening Brief. 
The issue of wThether there was a causal connection between the unsealed hole 
defect and the hantavirus contracted by Appellant, Chris Dimick, and Appellants' 
decedent, Cathy Dimick, was not before the trial court and was never disputed by 
Oakwood, which expressly waived assertion of that issue. 
Under these circumstances, summary judgment is improper and Appellant, 
Dimicks, respectfully requests this Court remand the case for trial on the merits. 
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Respectfully submitted this 2£ day of April 2006. 
MORIARITY, BADARUDDIN & BOOKE 
7\-$rtr&Ls 
BRADLEYJL. BOOKE 
ROBERT D. STRIEPER 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court, after reviewing same, concludes that the Motion for 
Summary Judgment by the Oakwood defendants is well taken and for the reasons outlined in 
Oakwood's argument and the facts established in their memorandum concludes that there is no legal 
justification for holding Oakwood defendants responsible nor any question of fact which needs to 
be submitted to The trier of fact not established by the record. For the foregoing reasons, the Motion 
for Summary Judgment by Oakwood defendants is hereby granted The Court requests attorney for 
Oakwood defendants to prepare an appropriate Findings of Fact/Conclusions of Law and Order for 
Summary Judgment herein. 
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THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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BRYAN DIMICK, MATTHEW KLOEPFER 
and BETTY JO KLOEPFER, heirs of the 
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Civil No. 020700324 
Judge: Bruce K. Haliiday 
Defendants. 
On February 28, 2005 the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by OHC Liquidation Trust 
as successor in interest to defendants Oakwood Mobile Homes, inc., Oakwood Shared 
Services, LLC, Schult Homes Corporation, and HBOS Manufacturing, LP (collectively 
"Oakwood") came before the Court for oral argument. The Court, having heard orai arguments, 
having reviewed the motions and authorities cited therein, and being fully advised, enters the 
following Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and resulting Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court finds that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and specifically 
finds as follows: 
1. On May 18, 1998, Happy Homes ordered a manufactured home from Oakwood. 
2. Pursuant to Happy Homes' order, Oakwood manufactured a home (model 
number 5828} bearing serial numbers 284627A and B (the "Home") for sale and delivery to 
Happy Homes. 
3. On June 24, 1998, the Home was inspected by an inspector for the United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Home met government standards as was 
certified by the inspector as such by the affixation of Department of Housing and Urban 
Development numbers 415130 and 415131 thereto. 
4. Happy Homes tendered payment for the Home and the Home was delivered to 
Happy Homes' sales lot in June 1998. 
5. Prior to accepting delivery and possession of the Home, Happy Homes' agents 
and employees inspected the Home. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order 
Dimick v. Oakwood, et al. 
Civil No, 020700324 
Page 2 
6. Happy Homes' agents and employees did not observe any problems with, defects 
in, or defective conditions in the Home when Happy Homes received, inspected, and took 
possession of the Home. The Home was ready for retail sale when received by Happy Homes. 
7. Happy Homes never notified Oakwood of any problems with, defects in, or 
defective conditions of the Home. 
8. On March 11, 2000, Christopher Dimick toured the Home with his parents, Reid 
and Cathy Dimick, and that same day contracted to buy the Home from Happy Homes. 
9. The Home sat on Happy Homes rural sales lot in Helper, Utah from June 1998 
until the Home was delivered to Christopher Dimick's property on May 22, 2000. 
10. Happy Homes hired John Schram to assemble the Home on the Happy Homes 
lot when it was received from Oakwood in 1998 and to disassemble the Home for transport to 
the Dimick property in 2000. Mr. Schram did not observe any defects in or problems with the 
Home on either occasion. 
11. Mary Musgrave worked as a sales agent for Happy Homes in Helper, Utah. Ms. 
Musgrave showed the Home to prospective purchasers "countless" times between June 1998 
and May 2000. Ms. Musgrave never observed any manufacturing defects in the Home and never 
saw any evidence of mice in the Home. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court finds that there is no justification for holding the Oakwood defendants liable for 
plaintiffs' alleged injuries and damages, and specifically concludes as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs failed to rebut the Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(3) presumption that the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order 
Dimick v. Oakwood, et ai 
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Home was free from any defect or defective condition because the Home complied with 
government standards relating to design, manufacture, and inspection of manufactured homes. 
2. Plaintiffs offered no evidence that the Home was unreasonably dangerous 
due to a defect or defective condition, no evidence that a defect existed at the time the Home 
was sold, and no evidence that a defective condition was the proximate cause of their alleged 
injuries. Therefore plaintiffs' claims against Oakwood for strict products liability and breach of 
warranty (merchantability) fail as a matter of law. 
3. There is no evidence of a defect or defective condition in the Home, a necessary 
element of plaintiffs' claim against Oakwood for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose, and therefore the claim fails as a matter of law. 
4. There is no evidence of any defect or defective condition in the home, and no 
evidence that Oakwood breached any express warranty, and therefore the claim fails as a 
matter of law. 
5. There is no evidence of a defect or defective condition in the Home, a necessary 
element of plaintiffs' claim against Oakwood for negligent failure to warn, and therefore the claim 
fails as a matter of law. 
6. There is no evidence that Oakwood had any ownership or possessory interest in 
the Home after it had been sold and delivered to Happy Homes, and therefore Oakwood did not 
owe any duty to plaintiffs as a premises owner. Additionally, there is no evidence of a defect, 
defective condition, or unsafe condition in the Home that proximately caused plaintiffs' alleged 
injuries. Because these are necessary elements of plaintiffs' premises liability claim against 
Oakwood, the claim fails as a matter of law. 
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ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by OHC 
Liquidation Trust as successor in interest to Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., Oakwood Shared 
Services, LLC, Schult Homes Corporation, and HBOS Manufacturing, LP is granted. Judgment 
is entered in favor of defendants Oakwood Mobile Homes, inc., Oakwood Shared Services, LLC, 
Schult Homes Corporation, and HBOS Manufacturing, LP and against plaintiffs on all claims 
asserted by plaintiffs against these defendants in plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint, All claims 
against defendants Oakwood Mobile Homes, inc., Oakwood Shared Services, LLC, Schult 
Homes Corporation, and HBOS Manufacturing, LP are dismissed on the merits with prejudice. 
In accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), the Court finds there is no just reason for delay 
and directs entry of final judgment in favor of the Oakwood defendants. 
DATED this day of , 2005. 
BY THE COURT 
JUDGE BRUCE K. HALUDAY 
APPROVED AS TO FORM; 
BRADLEY L. BOOKE 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
! hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Certified Order of Final Judgment was delivered by method indicated 
below, to the following this day of April 2005: 
By Hand-Delivery 
Bradley L. Booke 
Jeffredy D. Gooch 
Moriarty, Gooch, Badaruddin & Booke 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael Zaccheo 
Ramona Garcia 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
50 South Main Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
By U.S. Mail - Postage Prepaid 
Samuel S. Bailey 
220 East 200 South 
Price, Utah 84501 
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Jeffrey D,Gooch(7&63) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Rcid Dimick, individually and as the 
personal representative of the estate of 
Cathaleen Dimick, Christopher Dimick, 
Ktrt Dimick, Jeremy Dfrrridc, Bryan 
Dimick, Matthew KLoepf er and Bc±ty Jo 
Kloepfer, Heirs of the Estate of 
Catherine Ann Dimick, Deceased; 
and Christopher Dxmick, individually 
Haintiffe, 
v. 
University Homes, Inc., dba Happy 
Homes (Helper) and dba Happy 
Homes Vernal, a South Dakota 
Corporation; Mike Haakinson; 
Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc./ an 
Indiana Corporation: lifestyle Homes, 
a Utah partnership/ John Scnram, 
Robert Hoggatt, Mary 
Musgrave, Heidi Essex and John Does 
1-X, 
Defendant 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO 
OAKWOOD DEFENDANTS' 
FROPOSED FLNDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
CERTIFIED ORDER OF FINAL 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No, 020700324 
Judge: Bruce K Halliday 
[ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED] 
Plaintiffs, through counsel* pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2), Utah R CiY, P., object to the 
Oakwood Defendants' proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and certified order 
of final judgment dated April 27, 2005
 % on the following grounds: 
Plaintiffs7 Notice of Objection to Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order and Certified Final Judgment 
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OBJECTION TO FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Tile Court granted Defendant's motion for smnmary judgment, bur did not grant a 
"Certified Final Judgment" 
2. The Court's written order-does not make the findings of fact listed as proposed 
Findings 1-1L 
3. There is no evidence in the record that "The Home met government standards*" as 
set forth in finding #3; the only evidence on that issue is that a numbered certificate was 
issued; there is no specification of the government standards referred to in finding #3. 
4. Finding #4 is contrary to the undisputed record as to when> how and who made 
payment for "fee Home" because the record shows that the home was not paid for until 
the Dhnick transaction dosed in late May or early June, 2000-
5. Finding #5 is contrary to the record with respect to Happy Homes' inspection of 
the Home before contains accepting delivery and possession. 
6. Finding #6 contains legal conclusions, not facts, concerning "defects* and 
"defective conditions/' and is contrary to the record as to Happy Homes making no 
observation about damage to the Home or defects in the Home at the time Happy Homes 
took delivery, and is contrary to the record as to tbe Home being "ready for retail sale" at 
the time of receipt. 
7. Finding #7 contains legal conclusions, not facts, concerning "defects*' and 
"defective conditions." 
8. Hading #S is contrary to (he record in &at Reid Dinuck did not "tour" the home 
on March 11,2000, 
Plaintiffs' Notice of Objection to Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order and Certified Final Judgment 
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9. Finding #9 is contrary to the record as to the identity of the owner of the sales lot 
on May 22,2000. 
10. Finding #10 is contrary to the record in that the home was not "assembled" on the 
Happy Homes lot and was not "disassembled** in 2000, and the finding contains legal 
conclusions, not findings of fact, with regard to "defects." 
11. Finding #11 is unsupported by the record is contrary to the record* and contains 
an expert opinion that lacks foundation in that the witness identified is not qualified to 
render such an opinion and lacks a factual basis for such opinion. 
OBJECTION TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Conclusion #1 is unsupported by the Court's order, which makes no reference as 
to compliance with government standards. 
2. The Court made no findings of fact that would support Conclusion #2; Plaintiffs 
did offer evidence of defect and defective condition in the design and manufacture of the 
home; and the issue of breach of warranty was not raised in Defendant's motion. 
3. Conclusion #3 is contrary to the record in that Plaintiffs did offer evidence of 
defect and defective condition in the design and manufacture of the home, and the issue 
of breach of warranty was not raised in Defendant's motion. 
4. Conclusion #4 is contrary to tie record in thai Plaintiffs did offer evidence of 
defect and defective condition in the design and manufacture of the home, and the issue 
of breach of warranty was not raised in Defendant's motion. 
5. Conclusion #5 is contrary to the record in that Plaintiffs did offer evidence of 
defect and defective condition in the design and manufacture of the home, and the issue 
of failure to warn was not raised in Defendant's motion. 
Plaintiffs' Notice of Objection to Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order and Certified Final Judgment 
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6. Conclusion #6 is contrary to the record in that there is evidence that ownership of 
the home did not pass untii after Cathy and Chris Dimick were exposed to Hantavirus, 
and in char Plaintiffs did offer evidence of defect and defective condition in the design 
and manufacture of the home. 
OBJECTION TO ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT 
1. Plaintiffs object to the granting of summary judgment of warranty and negligence 
claims because Defendant's motion did not attack those claims. 
X Plaintiffs object to certification of the Court's order under Rule 54(b) because 
Defendant did not seek 54(b) certification, the issue has not been briefed or argued to the 
Court, and such certification is untimely and would encourage piecemeal litigation, 
DATED this 29th day of April, 2005. 
MORIARITY, GOOCH, BADARUDDIN & 
BOOKE 
Bradley i i Booke (9984) 
9 Exchan^/Place, #700 
Salt Lake City, UT 841J1 
Telephone: (801)521-0811 
Fax: (801) 521-0437 
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Bradley L. Booke (99S4) 
Jeffrey D. Gooch (7863) 
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9 Exchange Place, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-0811 
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COURJ/CARBOIV 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Reid Dimick, individually and as the 
personal representative of the estate of 
Cathaleen Dimick, Christopher Dimick; 
Kiit Dimick, Jeremy Dimick, Bryan 
Dimick, Matthew Kloepfer and Betty Jo 
Ktoepfer, Heirs of the Estate of 
Catherine Ann Dimick, Deceased; 
and Christopher Dimick, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
University Homes, Inc., dba Happy 
Homes (Helper) and dba Happy 
Homes Vernal, a South Dakota 
Corporation; Mike Haakinson; 
Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., an 
Indiana Corporation; Lifestyle Homes, 
a Utah partnership, John Schram, 
Robert Hoggatt, Mary 
Musgrave, Heidi Essex and John Does 
I-X, 
Defendant 
PLAINTIFFS7 OBJECTION TO 
OAKWOOD DEFENDANTS7 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
CERTIFIED ORDER OF FINAL 
JUDGMENT 
Gvil No. 020700324 
Judge: Bruce K. Halliday 
[ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED] 
Plaintiffs, through counsel, pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2), Utah R. Civ. R, object to the 
Oakwood Defendants" proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and certified order 
of final judgment dated April 27, 2005, on the following grounds: 
Plaintiffs" Notice of Objection to Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order and Certified Final Judgment 
Page 1 of 4 
OBJECTION TO FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court granted Defendant's motion for summary7 judgment but did not grant a 
"Certified Final Judgment" 
2. The Court's written order does not make the findings of fact listed as proposed 
Findings 1-11. 
3. There is no evidence in the record that "The Home met government standards" as 
set forth in finding #3; the only evidence on that issue is that a numbered certificate was 
issued: there is no specification of the government standards referred to in finding #3. 
4. Finding #4 is contrary to the undisputed record as to when, how and who made 
payment for "the Home" because the record shows that the home was not paid for until 
the Dimick transaction closed in late May or early June, 2000. 
5. Finding #5 is contrary to the record with respect to Happy Homes' inspection of 
the Home before contains accepting delivery and possession. 
6. Finding #6 contains legal conclusions, not facts, concerning "defects" and 
"defective conditions," and is contrary to the record as to Happy Homes making no 
observation about damage to the Home or defects in the Home at the time Happy Homes 
took delivery, and is contrary to the record as to the Home being "ready for retail sale" at 
the time of receipt 
7. Finding #7 contains legal conclusions, not facts, concerning "defects" and 
"defective conditions." 
8. Finding #8 is contrary to the record in that Reid Dimick did not "tour" the home 
on March 11, 2000. 
Plaintiffs' Notice of Objection to Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order and Certified Final Judgment 
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9. Finding #9 is contrary to the record as to the identity of the owner of the sales lot 
on May 22, 2000. 
10. Finding #10 is contrary to the record in that the home was not 'assembled" on the 
Happy Homes lot and was not "disassembled" in 2000, and the finding contains legal 
conclusions, not findings of fact with regard to "defects." 
11. Finding #11 is unsupported by the record, is contrary to the record, and contains 
an expert opinion that lacks foundation in that the witness identified is not qualified to 
render such an opinion and lacks a factual basis for such opinion. 
OBJECTION TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Conclusion #1 is unsupported by the Court's order, which makes no reference as 
to compliance with government standards. 
2. The Court made no findings of fact that would support Conclusion #2; Plaintiffs 
did offer evidence of defect and defective condition in the design and manufacture of the 
home; and the issue of breach of warranty was not raised in Defendant's motion. 
3. Conclusion #3 is contrary to the record in that Plaintiffs did offer evidence of 
defect and defective condition in the design and manufacture of the home, and the issue 
of breach of warranty7 was not raised in Defendant's motion. 
4. Conclusion #4 is contrary to the record in that Plaintiffs did offer evidence of 
defect and defective condition in the design and manufacture of the home, and the issue 
of breach of warranty was not raised in Defendant's motion. 
5. Conclusion #5 is contrary to the record in that Plaintiffs did offer evidence of 
defect and defective condition in the design and manufacture of the home, and the issue 
of failure to warn was not raised in Defendant's motion. 
Plaintiffs' Notice of Objection to Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact Conclusions of 
Law, and Order and Certified Final Judgment 
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6. Conclusion #6 is contrary to the record in that there is evidence that ownership of 
the home did not pass until after Cathy and Chris Dimick were exposed to Hantavirus, 
and in that Plaintiffs did offer evidence of defect and defective condition in the design 
and manufacture of the home. 
OBJECTION TO ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT 
1. Plaintiffs object to the granting of summary judgment of warranty and negligence 
claims because Defendant's motion did not attack those claims. 
2. Plaintiffs object to certification of the Court's order under Rule 54(b) because 
Defendant did not seek 54(b) certification, the issue has not been briefed or argued to the 
Court and such certification is untimely and would encourage piecemeal litigation. 
DATED this 29th day of April, 2005. 
MORIARITY, GOOCH, BADARUDDIN & 
BOOKE 
£-T$UU 
Bradley U Booke (9984) 
9 Exchange Place, #700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)521-0811 
Fax: (801)521-0437 
V 
uu 
[By-
i (B [i D w E m. 
JUNO 6 2005 III 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DIMICK ana BETTY JO 
KLOEPFER, et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs • 
UNIVERSITY HOMES and 
HEIDI ESSEX, er al, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 020700324 
) 
Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
February 2 8, 2 005 
BEFORE: THE HQN0RA3LE BRUCE K. HALLIDAY 
Seventh District Court Juage 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
Bradley L. Booke 
MORIARTY, BOOCH, 
BADARUDDIN & BOOKE 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utan 84111 
H. Justin Hitt 
PLANT & WALLACE 
136 East South Temple, #1700 
Salt Lake City, Utan 84111 
Also Present Via Telephone: Michael P. Zaccheo 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, CSR/CCT 
1909 South Washington Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 377-0027 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
{Electronically recorded on February 28, 2005) 
THE COURT: Call the Dimick vs. University Homes 
matter. 
COURT CLERK: Do we need to call his attorney? 
THE COURT: Okay. Can you make rhat call? 
(Court clerk speaking softly) 
THE COURT: This was Zaccheo, wasn't it, that was — go 
ahead and sir down. Thanks, gentlemen. I'm sorry that I kept 
you all — you've been here as long as I have today. 
MR. BOOKE: Your Honor, I've been doing this 27, 28 
years; and I don't know that I've ever seen a day when anybody 
handled as many matters as you have handled while I've been 
sitting here. 
THE COURT: This was a bad day; and it couldn't have 
been a worse day. 
MR. BOOKE: Okay. Is it just because they're ail 
collected into a single law and motion day? 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. BOOKE: Is that the ordinary — 
THE COURT: Yeah, and usually if I'm going to have 
that kind of day, I have some sort of forewarning and I don't 
schedule oral argument. I think I did do oral argument before 
I had any idea that I was going to — 
MR. BOOKE: Well, I'm not complaining. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
- j -
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. BOOKE: I'm just observing the loads. 
THE COURT: I agree. Do you got Mr. Zaccheo? 
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Yeah, he's out there; he's there. 
(Mr. Zaccheo is present for hearing via telephone) 
THE COURT: Can you hear me, Mr. Zaccheo? 
MR. ZACCHEO: Just barely, Judge. 
THE COURT: Well, my voice isn't very good, but we'll 
try to speak up. We have Counsel here, and they've assured me 
that about ten minutes each is all that they're going to need. 
Who's going to lead off? Who' s motion? 
MR. HITT: It's my motion motion, your Honor. Justin 
Hitt on behalf of OHC Liquidation Trust. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. HITT: A successor in interest to --
THE COURT: Can you hear him? 
MR. ZACCHEO: I really can't, your 
you know, I'll just stay on the line; and ; 
any questions regarding my client, I'll be 
That's really the only reason I have to be 
(Counsel speak with clerk off the 
THE COURT: That's a recording. I 
magnify; but try to speak up if you can. 
MR. HITT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
Honor. I guess, 
_f the Court has 
happy to respond. 
here anyway. 
record) 
don't think it will 
-4 
MR. KITT: Your Honor, this case is right for summary 
judgment in favor of the Oakwood defendants, my clients. This 
case has been pending for two-and-a-half years. It's evident 
that there's no dispute as to any material fact at this point; 
and Oakwood is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
(Sound of dial tone of phone in the courtroom) 
THE COURT: Are you there? 
COURT CLERK: No, he's not. He hung up. 
THE COURT: Weil, we're on the record. We're making a 
record. He can get a copy of the record that we make; and 
let's just go forward on that basis. 
MR. HITT: Okay. Your Honor, in our opening memorandum 
we set forth material facts that we believe are relevant to our 
motion. In response, opposing Counsel did not dispute any of 
those facts in accordance with Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiff s focus on general allegations with respect 
to this mobile home that was purchased by Christopher Dimick. 
In March of 2 0 00 Christopher Dxmick toured a mobile home on the 
Happy Homes lot; and he alleges that he had his mother observed 
a mouse nest in this manufactured home. 
Now, a manufactured home that sat on the Happy Homes 
lot for two years; and in those two years Happy Homes had never 
observed a defect in the home. They'd never informed the 
manufacturer of a defect in the home. In fact, the home was 
-5-
delivered to Happy Homes without any problem. They had no 
concerns with it. They (inaudible) and sat on their lot. 
There is no dispute as to chat. 
Instead, plaintiff alleges that this home, as pare 
cf its manufacture, had 30 to 50 penetrations in the walls and 
the floors, so as to hook up electrical, plumbing components 
and that sort cf thing. Now, that's actually just a general 
allegation, not specific with respect to this Dimick home. 
The actual evidence, the deposition testimony of John 
Schramm who was instrumental m setting up the home, was that 
generally these penetrations would be calked, they'd be covered 
with belli paper, that type of thing. 
What's really important for purposes cf this motion, 
is that even if there were penetrations m the home, Utah's 
product liability statute says that a home is — there's a 
rebuttable presumption that a home is free of defects if the 
home was constructed in accordance with government standards 
applicable at the time. Now, this home, before it was tendered 
to the retailer, passed HUD inspections. They looked at it. 
They said everything was okay; and they sent it out. 
THE COURT: And you have an affidavit in your motion to 
that effect, don't you? 
MR. KITT: I have a HUD inspection checklist signed. 
THE COURT: That's right, okay. 
MR. KITT: That was provided in the course of discovery 
-6-
Now, the material facts with respect to the defect are clear. 
There's no dispute as to that. Which means that this Court can 
rule as a matter of law that plaintiffs do not have a valid 
strict products liability claim against my clients. 
Now, in order to prevail on a claim for strict 
products liability, as the Court is well aware, the plaintiff 
must meet a three-part test. That test is set forth both m 
the statute and in the case I've cited, Burns vs. Canada. 
Critical to a finding of strict liability is that there is 
a defect in the home; and that that defect existed at the time 
of sale and was a proximate cause of the injury. 
In this instance we don/1 have evidence of a defect 
that rendered this home unreasonably dangerous. The home was 
in accordance with ail government standards, and the retailer 
to whom the home was initially sold never observed any problem 
with the home's construction. It was just fine. 
Now, plaintiff's complaint is very difficult to read. 
I also attached that in papers. I don't know if the Court's 
had an opportunity to look at that, but apparently they both — 
they've been included plaintiff's other (inaudible) liability 
today, purport to assert it against my clients. 
One of those claims being breach of warranty of 
merchantability. Now, the case law says that the analysis 
for breach of warranty for merchantability is the same analysis 
as strict products liability, which requires evidence cf a 
~7
~ 
1 defect. There is no evidence of a defect here. 
2 Next they argue that there is a breach of express 
3 warranty; and rhey allege that the express warranty was tnat 
4 Mike Rackxngson told Hugh Dimick that he would have the mice 
5 nest cleaned out of the home before the home was delivered to 
6 Christopher Dimick. 
7 That wasnr: a warranty made by my clients. My clients 
8 had nothing to do with that promise. in fact, my clients never 
9 even had any notice cf alleged mice m the home until they were 
10 served with this lawsuit. 
11 An additional claim is that there was somehow a breach 
12 of implied warranty of fitness; and that the Happy Homes person 
13 — now, when they received the home took the manufacturing 
14 seal off of the home. So the presupposition m that is the 
15 manufacture, my clients, placed a protective seal around this 
16 home for delivery to the lot. Then once it got to the lot, the 
17 Happy Homes personnel took that seal off. 
18 So m that instance my clients didn't breach any 
19 implied warranty of merchantability, because they didn't take 
2 0 off the seal. They provided the seal; they didn't remove it. 
21 The next claim that is purportedly asserted is a 
22 failure to warn. That failure to warn has to do with Happy 
23 Homes taking off the protective covering, the manufactured 
2 4 place seal. So that claim is more appropriately directed to 
25 Happy Homes as the remover of that manufacturer's place seal. 
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Finally, they say that my clients are liable under a 
premises liability theory. The undisputed facrs are that my 
3 I clients did not own the home afrer it was sold. Happy Homes 
4 I in request for admissions, stated that they tendered payment 
5 I for Lhe home after they ordered it; and title to the home 
rested with the bankr not with my clients. My clients had no 
ownership interest: in the home after its sale. 
So essentially what we're left with in this case is a 
9 claim that these penetrations in the home somehow rendered this 
10 home unreasonably dangerous and defective. Instead, we have a 
11 siaiute, 78-15-6 subparagraph (3) that says that "A product 
12 presumed to be defect free if it's manufactured in accordance 
13 I with government standards in effect at the time." There's 
14 I no dispute here that the home was in accordance with those 
15 standards. So that presumption has not been rebutted. 
16 Therefore, under the authority set forth in Burns, 
17 because there's no evidence of a specific defect in this case, 
18 my clients are entitled to summary judgment, and there are no 
19 disputes as to material fact. 
2 0 THE COURT: Thank you. 
21 MR. BOOKE: And may it please the Court and Counsel, 
22 Brad Booke is my name, your Honor. I represent the Dimick 
23 family. There have been the depositions taken, I think, of 
2 4 every person who was involved in any way in the receipt, 
25 handling, and setup of the mobile home that's involved, and 
-9 
in the shopping for and the sale of rhe home that is involved 
here. 
A fair reading of the facts contained in those 
depositions and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
from those depositions present the Court with a record from 
which the following facts and reasonable inferences can be 
drawn. 
The Oakwood defendant manufactured a mobile home and 
shipped a mobile home to Helper,. Utah for placement on the 
sales lot that had between 30 and 50 penetrations m the wails 
of the home and in the floor of the home. 
Those penetrations were manufactured into the home for 
a particular purpose. The purpose for the holes was to provide 
for access for utilities that were stubbed out on the lot on 
the foundation where the home would ultimately be placed after 
it had been sold. 
The result of the placement of those holes was to 
provide access points — 30 to 50 SLOCBSS points for deer mice 
or anything else that might be on a lot that is m essence just 
a dirt lot up against a mountain. 
The testimony that is in the record of the case, your 
Honor, is that some of those holes were foamed to some degree, 
but not all of those holes were foamed, and not all of the 
holes were foamed completely. 
The testimony is that the floor of the mobile home --
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not the wails, but the floor of the mobile home was covered 
with a sheet of paper — that they call in the trade "belli 
paper." The further testimony is that ir. transit, when that 
home is shipped from the manufacturer IO the lot m Helper, 
Utah, the — that belli paper is torn; and that there are holes 
in that belli paper. 
The further testimony is that the manufacturer knows 
that that occurs. Knows the holes are torn in that belli 
paper, exposing the holes that are in the underside that 
have been manufactured into the underside of the mobile home, 
because the manufacturer provides repair or replacement belli 
paper to the mobile home lot in order to have it replaced after 
the mobile home has reached the lot. 
The testimony is that some of the walls of the mobile 
home are sometimes wrapped in a plastic shield; but testimony 
is also that most homes are not wrapped in a plastic sheet on 
the exterior walls. The evidence is conflicting as to whether 
this pa rticular home was 
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haunta virus carried by deer mice, and one of these Dimicks is 
dead as a result of the haunta virus. The other is permanently 
disabled as a result of the haunta virus. 
That is the factual information that is contained in 
the record that is before you at this time in the case. Now, 
as to the strict products liability theory, your Honor, that 
recited record does constitute a prima facie case of strict 
products liability. It does contain evidence that supports 
each of the three elements of the strict products liability 
claim. 
There is a defect specifically. That defect is that 
30 to 50 holes are manufactured into the home at the factory by 
this defendant at the time the mobile home is billed. It is 
shipped with those holes to the lot in Helper. It arrives on 
the lot in Helper with those holes in the condition in which it 
was manufactured at the plant. Those holes provide 30 to 50 
points of access for deer mice to enter. 
It is undisputed in this case — well, excuse me. It 
is a disputed question of fact whether the deer mice nests and 
the deer mice droppings were seen. There are two people who 
testified that it was. There have been two or three people 
who testified that those things were not present; but that's a 
disputed question of fact. What is undisputed is that Cathy 
and Chris Dimick contracted haunta virus. One died, and the 
other survives but is disabled. 
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1 The point is that with respect to the elements of a 
2 products liability case, there is evidence of a specific defect 
3 that was built in at the plant and that the product arrived in 
4 exactly the same condition as — in the way it was manufactured 
5 The evidence is disputed as to whether any or all 
6 of those holes, penetrations were covered; and if so, the 
7 evidence is disputed to what degree any or ail of those holes 
8 were covered. 
9 The fact is that there is evidence that supports the 
10 presence of a defect, evidence that supports the element that 
11 the product was delivered in the fashion in which it was 
12 manufactured, and evidence that the defect that is present 
13 causes injury and damage in this specific case. 
14 Now, I don't know that the argument has especially 
15 been made, but anticipating the argument that these holes were 
16 — these penetrations were made into the home for a particular 
17 purpose, and that that was a reasonable and proper purpose, we 
18 don/t dispute that these holes were manufactured into the home 
19 for a purpose. 
2 0 The problem is that there was an unintended result 
21 of that legitimate purpose. That unintended result could have 
22 been managed in a very simple way, but it was not. Those holes 
2 3 simply could have been covered up until the home was sold and 
2 4 it was ready for delivery to the ultimate consumer. 
25 As to each of the elements required, notwithstanding 
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1 I the statute, those elements , there is evidence m the record 
2 I that is before you that supports each of those three elements. 
3 I So a prima facie case is present. 
4 As to the warranty and negligence theories, your 
5 I Honor, that are argued for the very first time in the reply 
brief, very first time in the reply brief, under the case of 
Brown vs. Glover, your Honor, 2000 Utah 89 16P.2d — P.3d 540, 
the belated argument appearing for the first time in a reply 
brief about trying to add additional theories into a motion fo: 
10 summary judgment, those arguments are waived. 
11 The Brown case says, ^Generally issues raised in the 
.2 reply brief that were not presented in the opening brief are 
13 considered waived and will not be considered by the Court." 
14 Here's the critical one. >xThis is to prevent the resulting 
15 I unfairness to the respondent if an argument or issue was 
16 I first raised in the reply brief, and the respondent had no 
17 opportunity to respond." 
13 The fact here, your Honor, is that the defendant's 
19 motion is completely silent as to any motion on a warranty 
20 theory or on a negligence theory. The defendant's motion 
21 challenged only the strict products liability theory. The 
22 defendant's motion cited only the strict products liability 
23 statute. It cited only products liability cases. 
24 The defendant's motion cited nothing about a warranty 
25 or a negligence theory. The first mention of any attack on the 
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warranty or negligence theories in the plaintiff s complaint 
was in the reply brief. I think it is unfair of the defendant 
to do that; but also unfair and somewhat disingenuous to argue 
that it is not clear in the amended complaint what theories of 
liability the plaintiff alleges. 
First of all, the amended complaint that is attached 
to the defendant's reply brief is not the operative amended 
complaint in the case. They attached a second amended 
complaint. There is in fact a third amended complaint that 
is the operative complaint in the case. 
That third amended complaint lays out in bold 
underscored sections what each of the specific theories of 
liability are; and each of those theories of liability are 
specifically pied in contrast to the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment, which is completely silent as to any 
challenge on those theories. 
That is the very reason why that Brown case says that 
this is to prevent the unfairness involved m being unable to 
respond to something that is raised for the first time in a 
reply brief. 
The bottom line, your Honor, is that the plaintiff has 
an obligation to come forward with evidence in the record that 
supports each of the elements of a products liability theory. 
The record does contain evidence that supports each of those. 
I certainly agree that that evidence is disputed, 
-15 
that there is argument about it, there is conflicting evidence. 
That is exactly why this is a case a jury should decide whether 
that product was defective at the time it was delivered or 
whether it was not. This is a case for the juryto decide, 
and we respectfully request the Court permit that to happen. 
MR. HITT: Your Honor, if Z may. Three points in 
rebuttal. First, with all due respect to opposing Counsel, 
he takes too much liberty with the evidence in the record 
when he speaks of deposition testimony with respect to 30 to 
50 penetrations in the hole, as well as belli paper tears and 
those arguments. 
He cited John Schramm's testimony. John Schramm's 
testimony is set out in our reply brief where he says that the 
penetrations in the floor are not accessible because they are 
covered with belli paper. 
When John Schramm testifies about tears in the belli 
paper, he isn't speaking about Oakwood Homes in general, or 
even this Oakwood home in particular. He's simply testifying 
with his experience cf approximately 400 mobile homes. He's 
not pointing the finger at any particular manufacturer. So 
there is not such evidence that supports the claim against 
Oakwood in this instance. 
Second, Counsel says that the evidence in this case is 
conflicting and is in dispute. In response I would say that if 
the evidence were actually conflicting and were in dispute, 
-16-
those material facts that are disputed would be set forth in 
their opposing memorandum with citations to the record. 
The material facts we set forth in our opening 
memorandum were not properly disputed; and a fair reading of 
those facts indicates that those facts indicates that the home 
was delivered without any manufacturing defects and ready for 
retail sale. 
Most importantly, the holes penetrations that Counsel 
is alleging are a defect are not a defect. The home was un 
— was just like any other manufactured home that's being 
distributed across the country. They have penetrations in 
them. Those penetrations are signed off by HUD. They're part 
of the checklist the government has said "Not a problem," which 
creates the presumption that this home was free of defects. 
Now, this home did not fail them in any respect. The 
purchaser of the home, Happy Homes, observed nothing; informed 
Oakwood of no problems with the home. So to call these holes 
a defect goes against the statutory language of Utah/ s product 
liability statute, and also presupposes that homes should be 
delivered hermetically sealed. You know, that's not practical 
and it's not effective. 
These homes are living, breathing buildings, that 
have doors that open, windows that open. They're exposed to 
the elements. So simply because this home had penetrations, 
doesn't render it defective. 
-17 
Now, importantly, John Schramm's testimony is that 
holes in the wall of the manufactured home did not see through. 
You wouldn't look through one hole and see into the home, 
or in the home out the hole to see to the outside. They're 
protected in that regard. Again, the holes in the floor, those 
are covered with belli paper; and those aren't accessible from 
under the floor. So there's no evidence that those holes would 
be defective or unreasonably dangerous. 
Now, with respect to the plaintiff s complaint and 
these allegations, we know that in our opening memorandum the 
plaintiff's complaint was difficult to decipher; and it was 
entirely difficult to try and decide exactly what claims they 
were manufacturing against us. 
I think we can ail agree that plaintiffs are trying to 
assert with the greatest thrust the strict products liability 
claim. We would be happy to come back on another motion for 
summary judgment on the remaining claims if the Court would so 
like; but I believe that they were properly addressed. 
The argument was preserved in the opening memorandum 
by saying that, you know, wWerre not entirely certain what's 
being argued here." Plaintiff came back and said, "These are 
the claims that we're asserting against you," and in turn, we 
show that how those arguments were pled was not in fairness of 
defending against us. We would respect the Court's judgment 
to treat this as a motion for partial summary judgment on the 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
strict 
point. 
what tl 
produces iiahilxty damn as well as 
MR. 
With 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
ie test 
BOOKE: 
regard 
COURT: 
BOOKE: 
COURT. 
BOOKE: 
:imony c 
Your Honor, may I just 
to — 
I guess I'll allow it. 
Thank you. 
You've been so patient 
Thank you, your Honor 
Df the individuals says 
-18-
ours; ano suDimt it 
maKe one fj_nal 
w_tr me . 
With respect to 
we have cited 
and attached copies of the pages of tne transcripts of tne 
deposition tnat support tne facts that I have arguea to the 
Court this afternoon. We respectfully submit that they say 
what they say. I understand that Counsel doesn't agree with 
what they say; but clearly the evidence that we've argued _s, 
is supported by the deposition transcripts. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Do I not ever get to a question — or at 
least at this level of wnether there's evidence that the raurta 
virus came froir mice that were m th^s house as opposed to 
someplace else in the world? 
MR. BOOKE: For this motion, your Honor, I don't think 
we even have to reach that point. I think the threshold 
inquiry is --
THE COURT: These three — 
MR. BOOKE: — is tnere a defect in this home. 
THE COURT: Okay. Then it may surprise you, but I 
don't remember what Brown says, if I've ever read it. I intend 
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to go back and read it. I also need to read the specific 
documents that you've alluded to, because I haven't read 
those. I've read ma-ill y the pleadings
 r arguments, memorandums. 
So I'll try to rule on this as quick as I can. That depends on 
whether I start feeling better than I do now. 
MR. BOOKE: If you survive, 
THE COURT: Yeah, maybe that's an even better question. 
MR. HITT: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. BOOKE: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you for your patience, all of you. 
MR. HITT: Appreciate your time. Get some rest. 
COURT CLERK: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Pardon me? 
COURT CLERK: (Inaudible) back on the phone. 
THE COURT: Pardon? Oh, Mr. Zaccheo, are you back on 
the phone? 
MR. ZACCHEO: Yes, your Honor, I've been here for 
nearly the entire hearing, and I thank you for allowing me to 
attend this way. 
THE COURT: At this point m time we're not prepared to 
set any new dates or anything. So I guess we'll just let it go 
until I make some sort of a ruling. 
MR. ZACCHEO: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on September 23, 2005} 
3 COURT BAILIFF: Seventh District Court, Carbon County, 
4 Stare of Utah is now in session. The Honorable Judge Bruce K. 
5 Kalliday presiding. 
6 THE COURT: Please be seated. I apologize for my 
7 lateness. I had a telephone conference that I had to leave 
8 — make sure that the minute entries reflected what we did. 
9 So I took a couple of extra minutes. This is the Kloepfer vs. 
10 Essex, et al, Ettex, et al. I'll ask the parties to identify 
11 themselves for the record, please. 
12 MR. BOOKE: Thank you. Good morning, your Honor. Brad 
13 Booke and Robert Strieper for the Dimick family plaintiffs. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you. 
15 MR. HITT: Good morning, your Honor. Justin Kitt and 
16 Scott Christensen for the OC Liquidation Trust, successor in 
17 the interest of the Oakwood defendants. 
18 THE COURT: Thank you. Preliminary matters? 
19 MR. BOOKE: Nothing, your Honor. 
2 0 THE COURT: Where do we start? Who gots to jump right 
21 up? 
22 MR. BOOKE: Well, it's — 
2 3 THE COURT: Mr. Booke. 
24 MR. BOOKE: Your Honor, it's the plaintiffs objections 
25 to the proposed order proposed by defendant Oakwood on the — 
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1 on its summary judgment motion, and then -on the Court's order. 
2 To begin, just to give a short, very short bit of 
3 factual context so that our specific objections make sense, 
4 there are two sets of — or categories of defendants in the 
5 case. There is the manufacturer of the home, which is the 
6 Oakwood defendants here today; and then the other category 
7 is the owner/operator of the sales lot where the home sat. 
8 In that second category there are two defendants 
9 there, because the lot — the business was sold spanning the 
10 period of time that these events occurred. So there's a 
11 manufacturer defendant. Then there's sort of a sales lot and 
12 owner operator set of defendants. 
13 In that context, again very briefly, on March 11th of 
14 2000, Chris Dimick, who is then living in Nevada, comes over to 
15 Helper to look at homes because he is moving back to the Price 
16 area. Chris Dimick and Cathy Dimick go to this lot, meet up 
17 lot, and look through a home that is sitting on the sales lot. 
18 In looking at one of the homes, they pull open a 
19 closet door, see a dust ball of some sort in the closet door. 
2 0 Chris Dimick kicks it. Turns out that it's a mouse nest and 
21 some mouse droppings. They don't think anything in particular 
22 of it at the moment, decide that home and leave. Chris Dimick 
23 goes back in the back. Cathy Dimick goes home. 
24 Fast forward then 76 days, I think, to May 27-\ 2000. 
25 Cathy Dimick becomes violently ill, is life flighted out, and 
_ 4 -
1 dies within 48 — 60 hours of the onset of violent flu-like 
2 illness. May 30th of 2000, Chris Dimick also becomes violently 
3 ill, is life flighted out. He survives, bur is permanently 
4 disabled. The diagnosis of both of them — for both of them is 
5 haunta virus exposure. She dies; he survives. 
6 At summary judgment the Court asked whether you needed 
7 to address the issue of whether this specific exposure caused 
8 the specific haunta virus from which Cathy died and Chris 
9 became ill. The parties agreed that you did not at that time 
10 — because that was not the nature of the summary judgment 
11 motion. The contention by the Oakwood defendant was that there 
12 was no manufacturing defect. So we didnrt even reach the issue 
13 of whether that specific exposure caused the death and illness. 
14 Just so the Court will know, however, there is a known 
15 incubation period for haunta virus from — and it's 75 to 90 
16 days from the time of exposure until the onset of symptoms. 
17 Our evidence will be that the only time that Chris Dimick and 
18 Cathy Dimick were together in the same place at the same time 
19 during that incubation period was in that mobile home on the 
2 0 Happy Homes lots. So we will make that proof, but that was not 
21 the issue at the time of the summary judgment hearing. 
22 Rather, the summary judgment hearing concerned simply 
23 the — whether there was a defect in the home. The home is 
24 manufactured in Kansas. It is trucked in two parts or two 
2 5 halves over the highway to — placed on the lot in Helper. 
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1 The open sides of the rwo halves of the home during transit: are 
2 covered in plastic, and the underside is covered in plastic. 
3 Then they're sat on the lot, not connected to one -another, but 
4 set close to one another; as close as they can get them, but 
5 they're not attached to one another. 
6 As they are sitting there, as manufactured, the home 
7 has 30 to 50 penetrations in it in the exterior walls and in 
8 the flooring for purposes of connecting utilities, electric and 
9 plumbing, that would be stubbed out on the foundation where the 
10 home would ultimately be sat when it was sold. Those openings 
11 are not — the openings themselves are not plugged or covered 
12 in any way. 
13 Now, it was a disputed fact, according to the summary 
14 judgment pleadings whether and how completely those holes were 
15 covered, as the home sat on the lot. The defendant manufacturer 
16 moved for summary judgment on that basis, alleging that there 
17 was no defect. We disagreed. We argued that those holes 
18 represent a defect, because they are not plugged. 
19 The Court granted that motion, nonetheless; and that 
2 0 being the state of the record, it comes to the delivery and the 
21 signature of an order that reflects what the summary judgment 
22 was about. 
23 The important consideration — I think that the most 
24 important consideration from my point of view as to the breadth 
25 of the summary judgment order is that we still have all of our 
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1 claims pending against the two sets of owner/operators of the 
2 lot. 
3 So the problems, then, are twofold. Number one, is 
4 making this a final order under 54 (b) so that we in essence 
5 have to take an appeal now, while the balance of the case is 
6 still pending, ending up in a piecemeal litigation of sorts, 
7 because — I mean, with all respect, candidly we disagree with 
8 the Court's conclusion about — on rhe defect issue. So that 
9 is one problem; which is that we now end up having the case or 
10 litigating the case in two separate directions at the same 
11 time. 
12 The second problem is the breadth of the language 
13 contained in the findings of fact and the conclusions that 
14 were prepared by defendant Oakwood, because it is my belief 
15 as we have set forth specifically in our objections that those 
16 findings of fact and conclusions affect the remaining claims 
17 against the — against the two defendants who are still 
18 actively defendants in this case. 
19 Those defendants may — although we don't know, 
2 0 because we haven't reached that point — attempt to assert 
21 those findings of fact or conclusions, even though they 
22 didn't litigate those issues, as a defense, when in fact those 
23 findings legally do not accurately represent what is necessary 
24 for the Court to grant summary judgment on the products theory. 
25 In other words, it is over broad; and they're going to 
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1 — my concern is that they will attempt to assert more than — 
2 that the other defendants would attempt to assert more than 
3 what they should be able to based on summary judgment on the 
4 products theory. 
5 Now, a solution to the problem is to not grant 54(b) 
6 certification so that we do not have to litigate the two cases 
7 separately from one another; and to somehow fashion the order 
8 so that neither of the remaining defendants can assert sort of 
9 the law of the case or a fact of the case defense, to be able 
10 to assert the Oakwood order as against the plaintiffs in the 
11 remaining claims. 
12 That is sort of the short solution to the problem; and 
13 I would offer that to all concerned as a means of just quickly 
14 resolving it. Failing that, what we really need to do from our 
15 point of view is to simply go through the findings one at a 
16 time, and state our objections and argue those objections to 
17 you so that the specific final content of that order is what 
18 is actually supported by the record and by the facts in the 
19 record, as opposed to what we believe it -- it is right now. 
2 0 Before I move onto that, perhaps, if the Court wishes, 
21 we could address that approach, because I don't know that that 
22 affects this defendant. Well, the 54(b) part of it affects 
23 this defendant; but the second part of what I've proposed I 
24 don't think really does affect the Oakwood defendant. 
25 THE COURT: Do you want to respond to that part of 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
this argument? 
MR. HITT: Yes, your Honor, I do. Interestingly 
enough, the underlying facts that were deemed undisputed in 
this matter were largely taken from request for admission and 
interrogatories that were submitted to the owner/operator. The 
owner/operator actually responded to those, and provided us the 
basis for our motion for summary judgment. 
So to the extent that Counsel is saying that these 
9 owner/operator defendants would be bound by the findings and 
10 fact and conclusions of law, and rely on that, well, they're 
11 already bound by that; because if you look at our memoranda, 
12 the undisputed facts are taken from their own admissions. So 
13 they would be bound by those in the underlying litigation 
14 anyway. 
15 It seems to me that we're just sort of arguing and 
16 attempt — rearguing the underlying grant of the motion for 
17 summary judgment, which would be inappropriate here. We're 
18 essentially — we should just be limiting our argument to the 
19 proposed order, and not the effect that order is going to have 
2 0 on the remaining defendants; because the fact that there are 
21 remaining defendants is a consequence of plaintiff's decision 
22 to sue multiple parties in this one action. 
2 3 THE COURT: Address his — the certification aspect of 
24 the 54(b). I don't think that that was ever discussed. 
25 MR. HITT: It was not argued in the — 
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1 I MR. BOOKE: You're right, your Honor. At the summary 
2 judgment hearing we didn't — when the Court took it under 
3 advisement, you know, we didn't request that the order be 
4 certified as final at chat point. That's why in our proposed 
5 J order we put that certification, leaving it to the Judge' s 
discretion whether or not to certify it as final. 
7 | Pursuant to Rule 54(b), the Judge does have discretion 
8 to certify a judgment as final for appeal when there's no just 
9 reason for delay. There are three conditions that must be met 
10 under that/ and it goes back to the seminal case of Pate vs. 
11 Marathon. 
12 The first requirement — the first requirement is that 
13 there must be multiple claims for relief and multiple parties 
14 to the action. We have multiple parties here; and you know, 
15 the Oakwood defendants represent an independent party, separate 
1 6 and apart from the owner/operators . 
17 The second, the judgment must be appealable but for 
18 the fact that there are other parties. If there weren't other 
19 parties here, your judgment granting our motion for summary 
2 0 judgment would be appealable, because the claim would be, you 
21 know, fully dissolved against this party. 
22 Then the third requirement is that there — that the 
23 Judge must determine that there's no just cause for delay. 
2 4 There's no just cause for delay here. All the claims have 
25 been dissolved against the defendants Oakwood pursuant to your 
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1 I memorandum decision. 
2 As we spoke with the Court about in the telephone 
3 conference on that September 12^b, Oakwood — the Oakwood 
4 defendants have gone through bankruptcy. They are now — 
5 their assets are now being distributed by the OAC Liquidation 
6 Trust, and these assets are being distributed through a 
7 J bankruptcy proceeding in Delaware. This claim is one of the 
single largest claims that that bankruptcy Court is having to 
9 I deal with. 
10 So while Counsel's argument that there's no just 
11 reason for piecemeal litigationr we submit that there is, 
12 because the claims here have been resolved; and it is going 
13 to be incumbent upon the Oakwood defendants and the OAC 
14 Liquidation Trust to go back to the bankruptcy Court and show 
15 them that this action is fully resolved here. That's the basis 
16 for our request of 54(b) certification. 
17 THE COURT: The second prong, tell me that again. 
18 MR. BOOKE: The second prong is that but for the 
19 presence of other parties, the order would be immediately 
20 appealable and what — and that's essentially that there isn't 
21 a counterclaim pending against the plaintiff or a cross claim 
22 that hasn't been decided on. It's all the claims between the 
23 parties have been decided. 
24 THE COURT: Well, I think that their response would 
25 suggest that we're going to have to go to the second step in 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
your suggests .on. That is, to 
and the individual 
MR. BOOKE 
to respond on the . 
THE 
MR. 
COURT 
BOOKE 
findings. 
: All right 
54 (b) point, 
: Yeah, and 
look at 
Thank 
•chough, 
I'm not 
: I understand. As 
the individual 
you, 
the 
your 
object 
Honor. On 
Court — 
ruling on 
to those t 
; rhat multiple claims and multiple parties, 
to whether rhis is appealable 
certs 
rhat 
:hree 
dnly 
yet. 
prongs 
true. 
absent the existence of the o 
-11-
ions 
— 
As 
ther 
parties, I disagree with that point; because there were five 
causes of action alleged against the Oakwood defendant. 
Their motion for summary judgment raised only the 
products liability theory. We pointed that out to the Court 
in our opposition, and in their reply brief for the first rime 
they argued, *xOh, well, it doesn'r make any difference. It's 
all the same." Utah law is clearly to the contrary. You 
cannot assert something for the first time in rhe reply brief. 
So we would disagree on that point. 
On the third issue — third element, the just cause 
point, I mean, piecemeal litigation really is the key to that; 
but the fact is that the Oakwood defendant and its liquidation 
trust and whomever is involved in that has done whatever 
they've done, knowing full well that this is still a pending 
matter. So I'd respectfully suggest they took those actions 
at their own peril. That said, I mean, we think that the 54(b) 
certification had — just has the effect of making two lawsuirs 
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1 out of one* 
2 Moving onto the specific findings of face, finding of 
3 fact No. 3 says that on June 24th, 1998 the home is inspected by 
4 the United States Government and certified by the United States 
5 Government. 
6 There is no evidence in the record of thar fact. What 
7 there is is a form called the "HUD checklist." Somebody went 
8 through a HUD checklist and checked off four pages worth of 
9 stuff; but there is no evidence before your Honor that that 
10 was a government inspector that did that. No evidence that 
11 there was any government approval of that — or inspection or 
12 approval of that particular home. 
13 With respect to — 
14 THE COURT: Doesn't — doesn't the business record that 
15 was submitted do that? 
16 MR. BOOKE: I think not. 
17 THE COURT: Isn't that a business record? 
18 MR. BOOKE: Well, I've got it right here, your Honor. 
19 It says — it's called a "HUD Compliance Assurance Inspection 
2 0 Form." Now, there is nothing whatsoever that shows on the face 
21 of the document or suggests — nor is there any testimony or 
22 covering affidavit or anything like that that says that that's 
2 3 a government form. 
24 MR. HITT: Your Honor, I have to object here. 
25 THE COURT: I think — I think there was. I think there 
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1 was testimony "Do the effect that that' s exactly what that was . 
2 MR. HITT: And the issue here, your Honor, Mr. Booke's 
3 going too far, because he did not dispute any of these in his 
4 underlying memorandum. He's raising these disputes for the 
5 first time after the judgment has already been rendered. He 
6 had the opportunity to attack the HUD form in whatever manner 
7 he chose in his opposition to our motion. If you'll look at 
8 the pleadings, you'll see he didn't do that. 
9 MR. BOOKE: Your Honor, I — 
10 THE COURT: Well, in his objections to the findings of 
11 fact, paragraph 3, he says, ^There's no evidence in the record 
12 that the home met government standards . " 
13 MR. BOOKE: There is, your Honor, because the HUD, the 
14 HUD checklist was attached. 
15 THE COURT: We were just talking about, right. 
16 MR. BOOKE: Right. 
17 MR. HITT: Right. 
18 THE COURT: And again, my recollection, and honestly I 
19 can't remember that far back. There's too many things that 
2 0 have come in between, but my recollection was that there was 
21 testimony as to what that was, why it was — you're saying no? 
22 MR. HITT: There's none. There is a form; and I would 
2 3 respect — 
2 4 THE COURT: That was admitted? 
25 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes. 
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1 MR. KITT: Yes, and I would respectfully submit 
2 thai on its face it does not appear to be a United States 
3 Government anything. Does not contain — appear to be a 
4 certified by anybody anything. I think it is an in-house 
5 document prepared by the manufacturer when somebody goes 
6 through a checklist. 
7 MR. BOOKE: And your Honor, that's an interesting 
8 allegation he's making. However, he cannot raise — 
9 THE COURT: And I'm going to say that my recollection 
10 is to the contrary. So I guess you'll have to dig it out 
11 on appeal and determine whether it was or wasn't there. My 
12 recollection is to the contrary uhers. Where is your next one; 
13 finding 4? 
14 MR. BOOKE: No. 4, your Honor, the — No. 4 is a 
15 disputed fact, and it is disputed in the record. One side 
16 of that argument is that they paid for it when they bought it. 
17 The other side of that argument, there is specific testimony 
18 from the employees of the owner/operator that the payment for 
19 the home does not occur until the ultimate purchaser does the 
2 0 closing. That is when title passes; and that as it sits on the 
21 lot for sale, it is a consignment sort of situation. There is 
22 conflicting testimony on that point. 
23 MR. HITT: Again, your Honor, I'm going to object. 
24 It did not — this fact is taken directly from our initial 
25 memorandum. Mr. Booke did not dispute that in his opposition. 
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He's raising it for the first time in this hearing (inaudible). 
2 I THE COURT: Gentlemen, do you know what I did when I 
3 did this thing, and got me into this mess? I went and I looked 
4 at the objections. I.went and looked at the proposed findings; 
5 and I went down each one of them, and said, xxThat' s in there, 
6 that's in there, that's in there;" and I did it. I signed it 
7 J Without seeing your request for oral argument; and that's what 
got me into this — this little thing. 
9 1 So I have gone through these things, and I'm willing 
10 to go through them again if it's going to be of any help; but 
11 I'm having to say that the findings that I reviewed at the rime 
12 that I reviewed them reflected exactly what I thought that I 
13 had done. 
14 MR. HITT: Well, and I understand the Court's dilemma. 
15 I guess it's one kind of a problem for the plaintiff if there's 
16 a 54(b) certification. 
17 THE COURT: Yeah. 
18 MR. HITT: It's another kind of a problem if there's 
19 not, because statistically I guess the odds are that ultimately 
2 0 we resolve the case with the other defendants, and it probably 
21 never ends up on appeal if we don't have a 54(b) certification. 
22 If we do have one, then we don't have any alternative but to 
2 3 file an appeal now, and then the accuracy of all of these, and 
2 4 you know, does in fact become a disputed problem. 
25 So perhaps, then, in that context the solution is 
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1 I to deny the 54 (b) certification, deny the balance of our 
2 objections; and then we go from there. 
3 THE COURT: And confer to my judgment? 
4 MR. HITT: Yeah, and then we go from there. If we 
5 resolve the case with the other defendants, end of story. It 
6 never becomes a problem. 
7 We have, just for the Court's information just this 
8 past week conducted a scheduling conference with the other 
9 defendants, and we now have scheduled out the balance of the 
10 case. So — 
11 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, if I may respond to the 
12 54(b), Mr. Booke is essentially asking for this Court to hold 
13 the Oakwood defendants hostage while his action proceeds 
14 against the other defendants. We'd submit that that's 
15 inappropriate here. 
16 We request that this Rule 54(b) certification in our 
17 proposed order. The Court considered that with due care; and 
IB the Judge — and your"Honor signed that order. Mr. Booke 
19 hasn't identified any palpable prejudice that his client would 
2 0 suffer as a result of this matter being certified as final. 
21 They have the opportunity to take this up on appeal 
22 and have his objections to the order considered and make his 
23 arguments there. You know, we've got to — we've got to play 
24 by the rules here. Rule 54(b) provides for precisely this kind 
25 of situation, where all claims are disposed of against one 
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1 party, and a plaintiff can still proceed against the other 
2 parties. 
3 We'd submit that the 54(b) justification is warranted 
4 here based on the extenuating circumstances of the bankruptcy 
5 proceedings, actions that have already been taken based on the 
6 initial signing of the final judgment; and clearly the lack of 
7 prejudice to the plaintiff should be considered. 
8 MR. BOOKE: Your Honor, you know, I listened to the 
9 defendant argue about what we didn't raise in our opposition to 
10 summary judgment motion, and that we need to play by the rules. 
11 Well, that's a two-way street. 
12 They didn't seek 54(b) certification at any time until 
13 they submitted an order to your Honor; never argued that; never 
14 presented that. It was never in paper. It was never oral. 
15 The first chance that we had to deal with it and to address it 
16 was in the objections to the order, and we immediately did so. 
17 There clearly is palpable prejudice. One part of 
18 the prejudice is that if the other defendants attempt to assert 
19 it as a sword or a shield against us in the balance of the 
20 litigation. The other is that we've got to litigate two cases 
21 now. So there is — you know, there is indeed prejudice that 
22 results. 
23 MR. HITT: Again, your Honor — 
24 THE COURT: One last — 
2 5 MR, CHRISTENSEN: — with respect to the sword and 
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1 I shield to the other defendants, I j.ust remind the Court 
2 that the sword and shield was actually created by the other 
3 defendants, the owner/operator. They're the ones that admitted 
4 there were no problems with the home when they received it. 
5 They're the ones that admitted they were in and out of the 
6 house. They never saw, you know, mice or anything like that. 
7 They're going to be the ones that are bound by their 
8 previous admissions; because as this Court knows, it's very 
9 difficult to retract any admission to a request for admission. 
10 So they're going to be bound by those. 
11 MR. HITT: Your Honor, I apologize. May I just one 
12 specific thought on that? Facts are one thing. They're stuck 
13 — the other defendants are stuck with whatever facts they 
14 admitted; but that is not how they — those things are couched 
15 in the order. In the order they're couched in terms of defects 
16 and defective conditions. Those are legal conclusions. Those 
17 are not facts. 
18 That is, when two defendants, two codefendants serve 
19 one another in discovery; and one defendant says to the other 
2 0 defendant, xxHey, did you think there was anything wrong with 
21 our product?" and the other defendants says, ^xNo, we don't 
22 think there's anything wrong with your product," you know, 
23 that kind of discovery should not give rise to binding facts 
24 that affect the future of the claims when only one party has 
25 sought relief. Those are the, quote, AXfacts" that Counsel is 
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1 referring to. That's apparent from their moving papers. 
2 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
4 MR. CHRISTENSEN: If I may, I have two representatives 
5 of the OC Liquidation Trust here that flew in from out of stare 
6 to attend this hearing. If the Court has any interest in 
7 hearing from them with respect to rhe proceedings in the 
8 bankruptcy Court that have been taken, they're available. 
9 THE COURT: Thank you. Respond, if you will, to the 
10 allegations by plaintiff that the motion for summary judgment 
11 was only as "co one claim, as opposed to all claims. 
12 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, prior to our filing our 
13 motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs had filed two 
14 complaints; filed one complaint, then they filed an amended 
15 complaint. Eventually there was a second amended complaint. 
16 Our motion is based on the second amended complaint. 
17 In that second amended complaint, plaintiff's Counsel 
18 alleged various allegations against the multiple defendants. 
19 They don't parse the — specify who they're pleading against. 
2 0 They just say, "All defendants this, all defendants that." 
21 In going through those actual pleadings, we were left, 
22 as defendants, to determine which of those causes of action 
23 were they asserting against us, now set forth in our initial 
24 memorandum. From their second amended complaint, it appeared 
25 that only the products liability and perhaps the breach of 
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1 implied warranty were being asserted against the Oakwood 
2 defendants. So we addressed those in our memorandum. 
3 In reply, plaintiffs argued that no, there were other 
4 causes of action that were being argued. In turn, in our reply 
5 brief we argued why each of those causes of actions that they 
6 are allegedly asserting against Oakwood don't really apply, and 
7 we've specified those allegations. 
8 In oral argument Mr. Booke argued that there was 
9 actually a third amended complaint that was at issue. Now, I 
10 pulled the Court's docket, and in April or 2004 plaintiff's 
11 Counsel filed a request for leave to file a third amended 
12 complaint. 
13 They didn't serve that motion for leave to either 
14 --to any of the defendants. Once the — and the Court did 
15 grant that motion; but that third amended complaint was never 
16 served on any defendant. I have the Court's docket printed out 
17 here to show that. No defendant filed an answer to a third 
18 amended complaint. There's no service -- proof of service of a 
19 third amended complaint. 
2 0 So we're stuck, for purposes of our motion, with the 
21 second amended complaint; and that's what we addressed in our 
22 motion. That's why there's this disagreement over the five 
23 causes of action. Those five causes of action were addressed, 
24 as alleged, in the second amended complaint in all of our 
2 5 pleadings. 
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1 J THE COURT: Do you remember at oral argument any 
2 discussion about those claims, and that we were really only 
3 focusing on the limited — 
4 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Right, the (inaudible), your Honor, 
5 no. At oral argument we — it was our position that ail five 
6 causes of action had been addressed in our pleadings; and 
7 they were at issue for oral argument. Mr. Booke — that's 
8 when Mr. Booke argued for the first time rhe third amended 
9 complaint. That's what prompted me to go back in the record 
10 and see if there even was a third amended complaint, which I 
11 didn't receive a copy of. 
12 Specifically I would direct the Court to our reply 
13 memorandum in support of summary judgment, where we raise 
14 those causes of action. We show why they didn't apply; and 
15 plaintiff's Counsel had the opportunity to request additional 
16 briefing on that to respond to those contentions; but he 
17 didn't. He left it for oral argument. 
18 Also, in the first brief, in discussing the Utah Code 
19 Annotated Section 7 8-15-6, which is the rebuttable presumption 
2 0 of a defect; or if a house is in conformance with government 
21 status, and there's — or product, and there's no — presumably 
22 no defect, and it's up to plaintiffs to rebut that. In doing 
2 3 that we said that — specifically quoting from my brief: 
24 "In order to prevail under a products liability, 
25 breach of express or implied warranty or negligence theory 
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1 against Oakwood, plaintiffs must provide some evidence of a 
2 manufacturing defect in a home." Because they didn't provide 
3 that evidence, it was our contention that all of their claims 
4 fail as to Oakwood. 
5 THE COURT: Did you want to respond? You started to. 
6 MR. BOOKE: Yes, and I apologize if I was interrupting. 
7 That's just not the state of the record. The second amended 
8 complaint alleges causes of action, five of them, in which the 
9 defendants, plural, and there isn't anything whatsoever that 
10 narrows that. 
11 Now, the third amended complaint also does that. It 
12 doesn't make any difference, I don't think, because in that 
13 respect they're both the same. There was a motion for an 
14 order allowing leave to file the amended com — third amended 
15 complaint; and it is signed. It says, "The third amended 
16 complaint attached as Exhibit 1 is deemed filed May 3rd, 2004." 
17 I'm not sure about the service. "We show service, but you know, 
18 I'm not in a position to dispute what Counsel says. 
19 However, when Oakwood's summary judgment motion was 
2 0 filed, on page 1 of the opposition I specifically noted, "The 
21 motion should be styled a motion for partial summary judgment 
22 because it seeks judgment only on the strict products liability 
23 theory." I said that specifically in my initial opposition to 
24 the summary judgment motion because that is in the entirety of 
25 the summary judgment motion all that is referred to. Those 
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1 other causes of action are never even referenced. 
2 I would specifically call the Court's attention LO 
3 page 4 of the motion, "Plaintiffs do not poinr to a specific 
4 manufacturing defect that allowed mice to enter the home." 
5 Lower on page 4, "No evidence that a defect in the home 
6 allowed 
7 THE COURT: Are you r e f e r r i n g to your p lead ing or to 
8 theirs? 
9 MR. BOOKE: I was first referring to my pleading, page 
10 2, the footnote. There's a full paragraph foornote. This is 
11 not the objection, your Honor. This is my opposition to uheir 
12 summary judgment motion where I at that time specifically 
13 pointed out that the summary judgment motion addressed only 
14 the products liability theory of liability. It is not until 
15 the reply brief, where they said, "Oh, it doesn't matter. 
16 They're all the same.'' 
17 That is contrary to specific Utah law that I did argue 
18 at the time of the summary judgment hearing. The case was nhen 
19 and is Brown vs. Glover at 16 P.3d 540 2000 Utah 89. It says, 
2 0 "Issues in a reply brief not presented in the opening brief are 
21 considered waived and will not be considered." 
22 Their summary judgment motion says what ±z says. I 
23 pointed out that they didn't argue the other four theories in 
2 4 their summary judgment motion; and they addressed them for the 
25 first time in their reply brief. So that's the state of the 
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1 record. I mean, people can argue whatever intentions nhey may 
2 wish, but that is the state of the record, your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: Thank you. 
4 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, if I may, we are bound by 
5 our pleadings; and Oakwood will be bound by its pleadings. I'd 
6 direct the Court to our initial memorandum.., page 8, subsection 
7 (a), where we state — where we reference all five claims and 
8 when we say, "In order to prevail under a products liability, 
9 breach of express or implied warranty or a negligence theory 
10 against Oakwood, plaintiffs must provide evidence of a 
11 manufacturing defect in the home.7' 
12 That's because Utah Code Annotated 78-15-6 reads, "In 
13 any action for damages for personal injury, debt or property 
14 damage allegedly caused by a defect in a product, you have to 
15 show that the product is — " it says, "No product shall be 
16 considered to have a defect if it's in accordance with 
17 government standards." 
18 So, you know, I think we're getting a little off 
19 topic here. Everything's in the pleadings. The issues were 
2 0 briefed. The issues were argued at oral argument; and the 
21 order as presented does adequately address all of the issues. 
22 MR. BOOKE: Your Honor, it's nice to pick a little 
23 snippet from something. Then you go over to page 12 and it 
24 says, "The facts of this case must be contrasted with other 
2 5 Utah products liability cases." I mean, honestly, I don't 
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think you can read this motion in its entirety and think that 
it's about anything but a products liability theory. It is 
what it is. 
THE COURT: Well, I may be wrong. I've been wrong 
before, but I'm going to confirm the order that I signed; and 
I'm going to confirm it as a certified order of final judgment. 
So you're going to have to take your appeal appropriately under 
those circumstances. I think that's all I need to do. I've 
signed the order. You can prepare another order if you want to 
and I'll sign it. 
MR. BOOKE: Your Honor — 
THE COURT: I guess I'll sign it; I'll have to do that. 
MR. BOOKE 
THE COURT* 
MR. BOOKE: 
THE COURT: 
MR. BOOKE: 
today? 
THE COURT: 
MR. HITT: 
signature now. 
THE COURT: 
MR. BOOKE: 
THE COURT: 
MR. HITT: 
Yes. Thank you. 
So that the date — 
Correct. 
— that the date complies. 
Right. So uhe order, is that effective 
Today. 
And I have one, your Honor, ready for j 
Have you seen that? 
I have not. 
Why don't you — 1 
It's verbatim of the — 1 
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1 [ THE COURT: Of the other one? 
2 MR. HITT: It's just (inaudible). 
3 MR. BOOKE: I*11 trust Counsel's representation. 
4 THE COURT: Thank you. Bring it forward and I'll sign 
5 it. You know, it makes it awfully hard for me when you guys 
6 come and you're prepared like this; but I do appreciate it. Do 
7 you want me to ask Mr. Booke if he'll sign? 
8 MR. HITT: (Inaudible). 
9 MR. BOOKE: I'm not waiving my — 
10 THE COURT: No, no, you're not waiving anything. It 
11 just appears to reflect the judgment of this Court. 
12 MR. HITT: It does say as to form only, so — 
13 THE COURT: Right. 
14 MR. HITT: No/ it doesn't say ^form only." It says 
15 *form." 
16 MR. BOOKE: Your Honor, would it be possible to obtain 
17 a conformed copy of this today? 
18 THE COURT: Yeah, I'll have my clerk take the files 
19 out, and she'll make a conformed copy right this minute. 
2 0 MR. BOOKE: Thank you, your Honor. 
21 MR. HITT: Thank you. 
22 THE COURT: Thank you all. 
23 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Thank you, your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: We'll be adjournment. 
25 (Hearing concluded) 
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